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Accidental or Deliberate Failure? 
The Story of Estonia’s Defence Concept of 1993
Hain Rebas 
ABSTRACT 
One of my more important duties as the first post-war constitutional defence 
minister of Estonia, was to develop a national defence concept.1 We prepared 
this together with Colonel Ants Laaneots, who was then Chief of Staff of Esto-
nian Defence Forces. Once the initial framework was established, a couple of 
officials of the Ministry of Defence became involved; ultimately a large num-
ber of external experts from the Academy of Sciences to the Estonian Maritime 
Administration contributed to the concept. The result of this broad and creative 
co-operation, the first defence concept, was strongly influenced by Finnish and 
Swedish total defence thinking. It was proposed to the Riigikogu and debated in 
pleno in March 1993. Surprisingly, given a strong government coalition major-
ity, the concept was rejected. The reasons for this most unusual parliamentary 
outcome may be found in domestic politics. Was the failure accidental? Or may 
it have been deliberate? As we know, three years later, in 1996, the next Riigikogu 
approved a concept for the defence policy of Estonia, a document little more 
than a more verbose development of our concept from 1993. 
Task and preconditions
The first post-war constitutional government of Estonia took office on 
22 October 1992. I had the honour of serving as its Defence Minister. My 
duties included the swift development, approval and implementation of 
1 This manuscript was reviewed by the then Chief of Staff of the Estonian Defence Forces 
(later General and Commander of the Defence Forces) Colonel Ants Laaneots, Secretary Gene-
ral of the Ministry of Defence (later Captain) Priit Heinsalu, Director General of the Security 
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the first defence concept.2 Surely, we all had to know why, how and against 
whom or what we had to defend our newly restored republic. Unfortu-
nately, there were no plans or preparation on which to draw, as my prede-
cessor had only taken office in June 1992. However, I was accustomed to 
organize large quantities of qualified text, and since I came with military, 
academic and public qualifications gained in Sweden, Germany, Canada 
and Estonia, and had recently published two fundamental articles on the 
topic in Estonia,3 I took on the job rather optimistically. 
This article is based on the draft of the “Concept of national defence” 
submitted by the Ministry of Defence to the Riigikogu, records of the 
Riigikogu debate of 16th of March 19934 and my bound diaries in A4 
format that I brought from Sweden,5 which I used to take notes. Also, 
rather fresh memories of the persons concerned, i.e. the Defence Min-
ister, the Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces, the Secretary General 
and the Adviser to the Ministry of Defence contributed strongly to 
the text.
As our new government, led by Mart Laar, aimed to blend Estonia 
into the West as quickly and firmly as possible, in essence to make this 
affiliation permanent, we also had to achieve this via a new, Western-
minded national defence concept. Despite a relatively small Ministry of 
Defence – only 23 employees at the time – I immediately had to fire the 
Deputy Minister (due to suspicions of serious corruption), the entire 
Police Board (later Minister of Justice) Jüri Pihl and Adviser to the Ministry of Defence (later 
Defence Minister and Colonel) Enn Tupp. I would like to thank everyone for their generous 
assistance and help in recalling certain events. The author is responsible for any inaccuracies 
that may remain in the text. (Author’s comment both here and hereinafter.)
2 Regarding the defence concept, see Hellar Lill, “The Constitution and interpretation of the 
authority dilemma for the leadership of national defence after Estonia regained its indepen-
dence”, see this yearbook p. 175 ff.
3 Hain Rebas, “Riigile kilp ja mõõk! Rahvas relvastada! Veel kord riigikaitse põhialustest,” /
Shield and sword for the state! Arm the people! Once more on the fundamentals of national 
defence/, Postimees, 12.8.1992; idem, “Eesti riigikaitse suhetest Soome ja Rootsiga,” /Estonia’s 
national defence relationships with Finland and Sweden/, Postimees, 24.9.1992.
4 Verbatim report of the 2nd Session of the 7th Parliament, 16 March 1993, http://www.riigi-
kogu.ee/?op=steno&stcommand=stenogramm&date=732268800 (accessed 5.9.2014).
5 “Tidkalender” 1992 and 1993, in the author’s archive.
219Accidental or Deliberate Failure?
Construction Department6 and two polkovniks, one for having given me 
polically harmful advice twice and the other for behaving far too passively 
for a high-ranking officer. And the main concern of the short-skirted 
secretary seemed to be to ascertain whether the new minister preferred 
blondes or brunettes… No, our Ministry was not exactly rich in intellec-
tual resources. But I was reassured by the fact that my main cooperation 
partner in the field of the concept would be the experienced Chief of Staff 
of the Estonian Defence Forces Colonel Ants Laaneots. Also, as a political 
back-up, our government coalition, i.e. Pro Patria, the Estonian National 
Independence Party (ERSP) and the Moderate Party, profited from a con-
siderable majority in the Riigikogu. We were confident that we should 
carry the floor in any Riigikogu voting.
Course of work
So we started from scratch, but were highly inspired and full of hope. My 
next step probably came as a surprise and as a source of dismay to the 
coalition, and especially to the so-called ‘back room’, the personal think 
tank of the Prime Minister. To learn more and to protect my own back, 
I invited three ‘formers’ , i.e. former national defence decision makers – 
Arnold Rüütel, Indrek Toome and Raivo Vare7– to discuss national secu-
rity issues. These meetings were enlightening in many ways.
In the meantime, Colonel Laaneots and myself had already started 
work on many initiatives, including on the concept. I was pleased to learn 
that the Colonel had been preparing for this for a long time.8 Since I came 
6 Enn Tupp ironically writes about the level of said Construction Department: “Builders of 
concrete fences for future military units”. (E-mail from Tupp to the author of 10 June 2014.)
7 Arnold Rüütel was the Chairman of the transition parliament, the Supreme Council of 
the Republic of Estonia, from 1990-1992; Indrek Toome was the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers of the ESSR from 1988–1990; Raivo Vare was the Minister of State in the transition 
government of Edgar Savisaar from 1990–1992. (Editor’s note.)
8 Ants Laaneots: “The Defence Forces Headquarters did a lot of research in 1992 regarding 
the selection of the national defence concept. We considered the military systems of large 
countries unsuitable for Estonia as a small and poor country. We focussed on small European 
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from Sweden and my father was a proud Suomen marskin vänrikki,9 the 
direction in which we should take the national defence of Estonia had 
been clear to me for a long time – we had to aim for the total defence sys-
tem as implemented by democratic Nordic countries, especially Finland 
and Sweden. It was a pleasure to realise that Colonel Laaneots, who had 
made a career in the Soviet army, had come to the same conclusions! We 
did not have a great deal of time, so we sometimes held work meetings 
in the evenings. I remember well how the floor of my modest hotel room 
could be covered in papers and maps even in the night!
Adviser to the Ministry of Defence, Enn Tupp was next to become 
involved in the process. He had been the Chairman of the National 
Defence Committee of the former Supreme Council and therefore had 
considerable experience in national defence planning. We had intense 
discussions among this inner circle, to which we also added the Minis-
try’s lawyer Tõnu Põder, and we certainly talked to and briefed our coali-
tion MPs on the topic. We wrote, dissected, thought, discussed, wrote 
again – as is the norm in this kind of work.
On the 14th of December I addressed the Riigikogu and asked all of 
the groups represented in the parliament to submit their visions and pro-
posals regarding the national defence concept to the Ministry of Defence. 
On the 17th of December, I wrote to all of the parties represented in the 
Riigikogu and explained that it was high time for us, dear colleagues, 
countries and Finland, Sweden and Switzerland stood out the most among them. We started to 
take a closer look at the national defence systems of these countries. As the Chief of Staff of the 
Defence Forces, I tried to establish close relationships with my colleagues in these countries, 
and succeeded. All three of them, and later Denmark as well, were ready to help us as much as 
they could. I visited all of these countries in 1992 to learn more about their national defence. I 
found the Finnish system to be the most suitable for Estonia, i.e. the total defence characteristic 
of Scandinavian countries as an total national defence system and military territorial defence 
as part of it. I was convinced back then and I still believe that it would be impossible to invest 
anything better for guaranteeing the primary self-defence of Estonia as a small country and the 
first state on the border of NATO and the EU. I remember that you agreed with these opinions 
wholeheartedly.” (E-mail from Laaneots to the author of 29 June 2014.)
9 Ensign to the Finnish Marshal (in Finnish); Robert (Rain) Rebas (1916–2008) graduated 
from the Estonian Military School in 1936. He served in the Finnish Army in 1943 and 1944, 
including in the Estonian Regiment of the Finnish Army (JR 200).
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to try to find common ground on something as important and expen-
sive as national defence: “Every political party must sport some kind of 
vision of national defence and how much it would cost”. Not a single party 
responded to my call, not even Pro Patria, the party of the Prime Minister. 
Thankfully, one of the members of the Riigikogu, Paul-Olev Mõtsküla, 
presented to us his personal vision.
Concept
The first full draft of our concept was completed by the 18th of January 
1993. Just a week later, on the 27th of January, we sent this source docu-
ment to the President of the Republic, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Ministry of the Interior, the National Defence Committee of the Riigik-
ogu, the Defence Forces Headquarters, the Defence League, the Border 
Guard Board, the Rescue Board, the Estonian Maritime Administration 
and the Institute of Cybernetics of the Estonian Academy of Sciences with 
a request to submit their opinions, both positive and negative, and their 
proposals for amendments by the 9th of February. By then we received 
responses from the Institute of Cybernetics and the Estonian Maritime 
Administration, and a few days later also from the Defence Forces Head-
quarters and the Riigikogu’s National Defence Committee. I also sent 
these fundamentals to Dr Erik Terk, Director of the Estonian Institute for 
Future Studies, who was pleased to accept them and promised to work 
them over with his red pen.
The initial version of the concept emphasised the idea of Scandina-
vian-style total defence, i.e. military defence together with foreign pol-
icy, economic, civil and psychological defence, which seemed to be the 
only possible model for a poor, small state. We all agreed that conscrip-
tion would be a perfectly natural, if not welcome, duty for citizens of the 
restored Estonia. We optimistically suggested that its duration should be 
18 months. The idea was that every young citizen, boy and girl, should 
dedicate a year-and-a-half of service to his/her homeland: some in the 
Defence Forces and others in the social sphere, such as hospitals, pre-
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schools and nursing homes. Comparing our nation to Israel,10 we thought 
that this system would gradually help grow, join and blend Estonian soci-
ety, fragmented during the Soviet era, back into a whole nation.
The peacetime composition of the Defence Forces foresaw an army 
with three or four regular units and single training units, the nucleus of 
a navy and a tiny air force. The wartime structure should include army 
units of general purpose (3–4 divisions as in 1940) and a well organised 
territorial defence (Defence League). But we also looked to the future. 
Cautiously, but decisively, we introduced an international dimension in 
our thinking – “Estonia integrates with Europe and cooperates with the 
collective security systems that follow the principles of the UN (CSCE, 
possibly also NATO, WEU), particularly with countries of Northern 
Europe and the Baltic Sea region”. In this boldly forward-looking spirit, 
we entered into the first cooperation agreement at the level of defence 
ministers with Latvia and Lithuania on the anniversary of the Republic of 
Estonia in 1993. Despite the issuance of a proper press release by the Min-
istry of Defence, almost all of our media publications missed the event (!).
Suurupi on the 27th and 28th of February 1993
In addition to the names listed above, we sent the draft of the national 
defence concept to Kalle Eller’s National Centre for Defence Initiative.11 
We invited all addressed institutions to a seminar about this subject, 
which was held in Suurupi on the northwestern coast of Estonia over the 
last weekend of February. Once there, we collegially went through our 
initial text, from start to finish. Together we resolved our disagreements 
10 The relationship between Estonia and Israel continued to develop well at the time. See: 
Hain Rebas, “Republic of Estonia on the road back to the West… Background and reality of the 
Israeli weapons deal 1992/1993”, see this yearbook p. 231 ff.
11 National Centre for Defence Initiative – the organisation established in autumn 1990 with 
the resolution of the Estonian government-in-exile on the basis of the members of the Defence 
League whose duty was to start building Estonian national defence. In early 1990, military 
ranks were still granted to the leaders of the restored Defence League by the government-in-
exile. (Editor’s note.)
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and prepared the skeleton of a developed concept. Minister of the Interior 
Lagle Parek, members of the National Defence Committee Rein Helme 
and Jüri Põld and Colonel Kalle Eller attended, as did Colonel Laane-
ots from the Headquarters, while the Defence League was represented 
by its Commander Major Johannes Kert, the Border Guard Board by its 
Commander Major Andrus Öövel, the Rescue Board by Director Ants 
Hein, the Estonian Maritime Administration by Tarmo Ojamets and the 
Institute of Cybernetics of the Estonian Academy of Sciences by acade-
mician Ülo Jaaksoo. Secretary General of the Ministry Priit Heinsalu sat 
for two days at his computer and entered all of the amendments as they 
were made. Today, some twenty years post festum, we might state that 
this was the highest-level conference in Estonia until then – all of the top 
players in the area of national defence were present and working together 
towards a common national goal.
Afterwards, in the Ministry, Enn Tupp once more went through the 
results of the collective work in great detail and then I did the same, 
just as thoroughly. I then sent the results to my friend, internationally 
well-kown author and also a MP Jaan Kross for a final polish – he also 
had a background as a Tartu university lecturer in international law. He 
undoubtedly “had a pretty good command of Estonian”.12 
In the meantime Lieutenant Colonel Lembit Tõns, the Chief of Staff 
of the Centre for Defence Initiative, was asked to prepare his own defence 
concept. What he delivered was a page-and-a-half of text, more like an 
essay written by a secondary school student.
The above should show that as far as the Ministry of Defence was con-
cerned, we did all that we could in a very short time to present a concept 
that was as broad as possible, competent, up-to-date, flexible, and also 
suitable for further development and legislative approval.
12 Jaan Kross (1920–2007), one of the internationally best known Estonian writers, graduated 
from the Faculty of Law of the University of Tartu in 1945 and was a lecturer in the Chair of 
National And International Law of the same university from 1944–1946. (Editor’s note.)
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The 16th of March 1993 in the Riigikogu
Well before the relevant session, our draft of the “Concept of national 
defence”, prepared in the elegantly polished Estonian of Jaan Kross, was 
distributed to all of the members of the Riigikogu. We wanted to give 
our honourable MPs, together with their fractions and parties, enough 
time to pore over the document before the official debate and voting 
ensued. 
What transpired during the sitting of the Riigikogu on the 16th of 
March could have been comic were it not so appalling; we almost failed 
to introduce the actual topic!13 Once again the opposition, true to form, 
focussed on launching long and detailed personal attacks against the 
Defence Minister. The Defence League also had to take severe blows. The 
main attackers were MPs Eero Spriit, Tõnu Kõrda, Olev Anton, Toomas 
Alatalu, Kalev Kukk and, repeatedly the troika Arvo Junti, Tiit Made and 
Jüri Toomepuu.14 Thankfully, there were also some who spoke out in 
support of the concept – MPs Rein Helme, Jüri Põld and Jaanus Betlem. 
Indeed, in our clearly open and flexible draft, we could perhaps have dealt 
with three or four of the 25 ‘shortcomings’ that MP Peeter Lorents listed 
with great satisfaction. But, as I said at the time: Mr Lorents’s “remain-
ing suggestions were either already included in the concept, offered at a 
random level or slightly banal, like his own ‘doctrine’ that he launched 
with great enthusiasm.”15 Today, some twenty years post factum, I will 
spare the reader direct quotations of this debate, which degenerated to a 
remarkable low point in the parliamentary history of Estonia. At the time 
I even labeled the show ‘grotesque’, in Rahva Hääl,16 the reprise of which 
13 See: Verbatim report of the 2nd Session of the 7th Parliament, 16 March 1993, http://www.
riigikogu.ee/?op=steno&stcommand=stenogramm&date=732268800 (accessed 5.9.2014). 
14 The intellectual level of MP Toomepuu is well characterised by his promise: “I could prepare 
a better document in three hours than the one Rebas managed in seven months. It’s simple, 
really.” (Allan Teras, “Tükk paberit Eestit ei kaitse,” /A piece of paper will not defend Estonia/, 
Õhtuleht, 7.5.1993.)
15 Hain Rebas, “Pokker riigikaitsega – kaardid avatud,” /Playing poker with national defence – 
cards revealed/, Rahva Hääl, 20.3.1993. 
16 Ibid.
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was issued on the 18th of March. In any event, there is no doubt that the 
final-year students from Tartu Treffner Gymnasium, whom I had just vis-
ited, had asked significantly more intelligent and pointed questions than 
did our MPs that Tuesday. That is what I thought then, and that is what I 
maintain today.
As we can read in the records of the Riigikogu session in question, 
we managed to give the opposition responses that were generally polite 
and factual enough. After being provoked several times by certain MPs 
with questions like ‘why do we even need national defence, who must we 
defend ourselves against, who could be our enemy here?’ etc, etc, I sighed, 
pointed to my forehead and answered: “Our MAIN enemy here is noth-
ing other than the prevailing post-Soviet mentality in your heads”.17 - So 
no, that day did not start well. I can only imagine how Herman Simm18 
and his mentors were smirking in the shadows.
As always, I left the Riigikogu with a formal little bow towards its 
presidium. Knowing that we had a strong majority in the hall, I had no 
concerns as I walked from Toompea down to the Ministry of Defence, 
which was located on Pikk Street at the time. However, when I arrived at 
the Ministry I learned, very much to my surprise, that the Riigikogu had 
torpedoed our concept! Instead of the expected 51 votes, we acquired 
only 43. This meant that eight MPs from our own government coalition 
had either a) deliberately sabotaged the draft prepared by the Minister/
coalition of the ERSP or b) simply missed this important vote.19 I then 
tried to discuss the events in the Riigikogu constructively and in detail 
in the media. Once again I emphasised the normal elasticity and open-
ness of our concept. I also recommended that they be published so that 
readers/citizens/voters could learn first hand what the debate was about, 
17 The records of the Riigikogu session say ’neo-Soviet mentality’, but that term was and is 
unknown to me. It was ‘post-Soviet’ mentality’.
18 High civil servant of the Estonian Ministry of Defence, who was convicted of espionage for 
Russia in 2009.
19 Member of the coalition Kalju Põldvere later apologised in Postimees (Kalju Põldvere, “Kelle 
viimased päevad?” /Whose last days?/, Postimees, 23.3.1993), saying that he had accidentally 
pressed the wrong button when voting!
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and to decide for themselves whether or not the blanket criticism was 
justified.20 Nothing was published...
Responsibility
In this situation, I could not help but ask how this blow, how such an 
outcome, completely unimaginable in Western European parliaments, 
could have become possible. How could a remarkable majority immedi-
ately abandon a professionally prepared draft, presented as a proposition 
by their own coalition government? Or were there more personal con-
siderations/weaknesses involved? Do we need to ask what our fraction’s 
usually super-effective ‘whips’ – also the Prime Minister’s close allies Illar 
Hallaste and Indrek Kannik – were doing at the session? Did they simply 
get themselves into a pickle? I find that impossible to believe about such 
well informed and capable men...
The result was still clear – our draft failed. But whose failure was it 
exactly? Was it the Minister’s (mine), my party’s, our coalition’s? Or, did the 
MPs just use the occasion to sink the entire establishment of the national 
defence of Estonia as a whole, all of us who we met in Suurupi? Or – and 
I have to ask this as well – did the Riigikogu just shoot itself in the foot? 
Or – perhaps the failure of the draft was caused deliberately? The fact 
is that it was around this time that the relationship I as an ERSP minister 
had with the Prime Minister’s so-called ‘back room’ began gradually to 
deteriorate. So, from the point of view of the pro-active Pro Patria back 
room, this could well have been presented as the appropriate time and 
occasion to put this rather self-confident and independent Defence Min-
ister in his place. This more conspirational version, that we have to pick 
up in another context,21 helps to explain the obvious and surprising pas-
sivity of our Pro Patria fraction leaders in the Riigikogu and the failure of 
their professionalism. 
20 Hain Rebas, “„Riigikaitse põhialuseid” saab tõepoolest paremaks muuta,” /The Fundamen-
tals of National Defence can be improved/, Hommikuleht, 6.4.1993.
21 In author’s memoirs to come.
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Of course, neither the Ministry nor the Defence Forces Headquarters 
let the disappointing results of the Riigikogu session bother them. We car-
ried on as we had done before and relied calmly on the same ‘half-witted 
defence concept’. A couple of weeks later, in the western spirit of the con-
cept, I sought out British General Garry Johnson, the Commander-in-
Chief AFNORTH22 or the NATO Allied Forces Northern Europe. He was 
residing in Kolsås near Oslo and I brought him to Estonia with his team of 
NATO generals in the following months.23 The rest, as the Brits say, as far 
as Estonia and its ultimate security goal NATO are concerned, is history.
22 Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces Northern Europe; General Johnson held this office 
from 1992–1994. He then led the team that gave military advice to the Baltic States and intro-
duced them to NATO high-level thinking.
23 General Garry Johnson and his team arrived in Estonia on the 12th of July 1993.
Estonian Foreign Minister 
Trivimi Velliste and 
Defence Minister Hain 
Rebas (1st and 2nd from 
the left) during a visit 
to the Kalevi Infantry 
Battalion (May 1993). 
Peeter Langovits/Estonian 
Film Archives
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Looking back and recommendations
What became of the concept? All of the defence ministers who came after 
me – Jüri Luik, Indrek Kannik, Enn Tupp and Andrus Öövel – worked on 
it for years with their teams. 
The Riigikogu finally approved the ‘Main Trends in the Defence Pol-
icy of Estonia’, which were submitted by Minister Öövel, in 1996. One of 
its authors, Enn Tupp, commented that the 1996 document was nothing 
more than a “more verbose development of our fundamentals of national 
defence of 1993”. “A modernising extrapolation” would be an even more 
precise description.
Almost twenty years later, in 2012, former Minister Tupp declared 
that with our concept of national defence of 1993: “[---] we were a bit 
ahead of time in developing the idea of our national defence, and our 
politicians were too blind to see our truths”.24 Tupp’s poetic assessment 
‘blind’ is figuratively correct, but only applies to certain members of the 
opposition. In addition to this ‘blindness’, some other personal charac-
teristics came through in this transition period, such as meanness, envy, 
the sheep and widespread mob mentality and many other hereditary or 
acquired personal qualities that would interest serious social psycholo-
gists.25 Also, the scandal-hungry Estonian media of the time, along with 
their Soviet era trained editors – who were generally devoid of all edito-
rial ethics – would make interesting subjects for media researchers. And 
students of political science, with the capacity for reflection, are invited 
to examine when exactly in spring 1993 the ‘back room’ of Pro Patria/the 
Prime Minister started to move away from the ERSP and more toward 
the ‘reasonable wing’ of the Coalition Party of former communist bosses. 
Finally, following from the sarcastic definition of a frog,26 KGBist i.e., 
by my good old friend Prof Tönu Parming,27 a major in the US Green 
24 As stated, my increasing unpopularity in the Prime Minister’s ‘back room’ must be added to 
the ‘blindness’ of the opposition. 
25 See the chapter about making someone a non-person in 1984 by George Orwell (1984).
26 “If a man sits like a frog, moves like a frog, croaks like a frog, then he must be a frog!” 
27 Tönu Parming (1941–1998) was born in Estonia. In 1944 he and his parents escaped to 
Germany and later to the USA. He studied at Princeton and Yale and became a professor of 
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Berets, in 1992/1993 we had our own Arne Treholts28 bossing around in 
the public life of Estonia. And Herman Simm was gaining momentum. 
All this to mean that our Security Police would have had a great deal 
to investigate. In 2014 General Laaneots stated the following about the 
events that occurred in the March 1993 Riigikogu: “Speaking of the coun-
teraction of the politicians against you as a minister who came from the 
West, then irrespective of the weakness of the military intelligence of the 
time, I received several reports in 1991 and 1992 which stated that the 
KGB had established their agency in the ERSP and Pro Patria in good 
time, when the parties were still being formed. I informed the Security 
Policy of these signals. There were probably enough such people in the 
Riigikogu and the political parties, and in the propaganda that we did 
not need national defence. And the witch-hunt against you,29 as someone 
who had come from the West, was also related to the activities of the spe-
cial services of our ‘friendly neighbour’”.30 
And so the Republic of Estonia, like a chess-horse often leaping two 
steps ahead and one aside, sometimes also taking a step back, like in the 
case of the 1993 defence concept, struggled successfully on westwards, in 
the direction of EU and NATO. 
sociology at the University of Maryland in 1981. He served in the US Army from 1962–1967 
and fought in the Vietnam War.
28 Arne Treholt – Norwegian politician (Labour Party), former deputy foreign minister in 
the bureau of maritime affairs, embassy counsellor of the Norwegian UN delegation and press 
officer of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mainly known as a strong “influence 
agent” for foreign powers. In 1985 he was sentenced to 20 years in prison for high treason and 
espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. He was released in 1992, lived in the Soviet Union for 
some time and then moved to Cyprus. (Editor’s note.)
29 There even was a terminus technicus for this in Mr Savisaar’s Central Party, that I learnt from 
MP/author Jaan Kaplinski already in 1992/1993: ‘rebasejaht’, i.e. “fox hunting, i.e hunting for 
Rebas”.
30 E-mail from Laaneots to the author of 29 June 2014.
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